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Institutional decisions about the future, that matter, are usually made in a context of
considerable uncertainty. Although the intention is success the possibility of failure
must inevitably be present, whether recognized or not. The principal purposes of this
study are twofold. First, we argue that uncertainty contexts require that decisions to
create the future are supported by a particular type of future oriented or foresight
narrative which we call a conviction narrative. Its essential function is to combine
available knowledge about how to achieve desired outcomes with the feeling that the
selected action will achieve the aim. Second, we introduce two states, in which
conviction may be achieved, divided, and integrated, to argue that research into how
conviction is achieved by individuals or institutions making decisions, can be an
extremely promising and practical avenue for foresight studies, throwing light on
several issues, particularly the oft‐noted reluctance to change course and attach-
ment to single stories of the future. The focus on the reality of uncertainty and the
two states in which it can be met, can also enhance the research and practice of
narrative foresight, through more systematic theorization of the role of emotion and
ambivalence in narrative thought and in the processes through which future‐focused
narratives generate action under uncertainty.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
A fundamental premise of much scholarly writing on foresight work is
the priority given to exploration of alternative futures over prediction
(Bell, 2005). As Dator (2019b) has argued, ‘[n]othing in society, be-
yond the most trivial can be precisely predicted. … The future cannot
be predicted, but alternative futures can and should be forecast’.
Rather than aiming at predicting the future, therefore, much foresight
work has the goal of ‘creating transformational spaces for the crea-
tion of alternative futures’ (Inayatullah, 2004, p. 8).
However, in both policy and strategy‐making, despite the in-
creasing popularity of foresight approaches such as scenario planning
and causal layered analysis (CLA), narratives about the future often
remain firmly wedded to the future as a version of the past. For
example, in the United Kingdom, debates in government about ap-
propriate responses to the unfolding COVID‐19 pandemic remained
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tied for too long to a narrative of the pandemic as “a bit like the flu.”
Jahel et al. (2021, p. 1) show that despite the discontinuity re-
presented by the COVID‐19 pandemic, representations of the future
produced in response to the crisis demonstrate ‘a reluctance to re-
think the present as a moment of discontinuity opening up the hor-
izon of possibilities.’
There is also evidence of communities of actors in markets and
policy‐making circles becoming captured by exciting single stories
about the future to the exclusion of alternative narratives. Examples
include the dot com financial bubble (D. Tuckett & Taffler, 2008), or
the enchantment with complex models for pricing and regulating the
risks of sub‐prime mortgage derivatives, full of unattended assump-
tions, which led to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (Kay &
King, 2020).
The common feature of COVID‐19, the global financial crisis and
its unanticipated aftermath as well as the threats from climate
change, and accelerating technological innovation, is that decision‐
makers must face uncertainty; “radical uncertainty,” as Kay and King
term it. In this context, existing decision‐tools, typically dependent on
optimizing a univalent utility function are found wanting, and en-
chantment with single stories about the future is likely to be
dangerous.
We argue, in this study, that conviction narrative theory (CNT), a
theory of choice under radical uncertainty (Johnson et al., 2021), is a
useful new approach to theorizing the role of narratives about the
future and how they facilitate human action. We draw attention to
the emotion work that CNT suggests is central to exploring futures
using narrative thought.
Narratives play a central role in human responses to uncertainty
and unexpected events and, as in the broader social sciences, there
has been a significant “narrative turn” in futures and foresight re-
search and practice. This is exemplified, in the work of Inayatullah
and colleagues on narrative foresight and CLA (Inayatullah, 2004;
Inayatullah & Milojevic, 2015; Milojević & Inayatullah, 2015) and in
Beach's theory of narrative thought (Beach, 2009, 2021). Under-
pinning this narrative turn is the recognition that narrative is a pri-
mary mode of knowing (Bruner, 1985) which mediates our
understanding across past, present and future; thus making choices,
action and strategy possible (Milojević & Inayatullah, 2015).
Narrative thought is already understood as a profoundly social
process. In our social world, we co‐construct and enact shared nar-
ratives, categories and frames that hide much of the uncertainty
which we face, largely getting “our worlds ready to wear” R. E. Brown
(1978, p. 11). As Milojević and Inayatullah (2015, p. 153) note “The
narratives we are born into…provide meaningful frameworks for
seeing, indeed, constituting reality. In doing so they also simulta-
neously shape boundaries for what is perceived plausible and
desirable.”
The narrative turn in foresight science has produced important
insights, including the importance of deconstructing unattended
frames and assumptions in narratives about the future
(Inayatullah, 2004), how narratives serve to generate expectations
about the future and imagine alternative futures in the face of
uncertainty and the unexpected, and the ubiquity of individual and
organizational defenses against overturning established narratives
(Beach, 2021). However, we will argue, existing work can be en-
hanced by systematic theorization of the central role played by
emotion in assembling and selecting narratives and in the con-
sequences for action over time.
CNT offers a theory of decisions and action under radical un-
certainty from three insights we will explore. First, in conditions of
radical uncertainty the central problem of action is developing suf-
ficient conviction in planned actions, while remaining open to in-
formation or ways of thinking that have the potential to overturn that
conviction. This is an emotional as well as a cognitive challenge.
Second, faced with radical uncertainty a predominant human
approach is to construct narratives; which evoke feelings, as well as
thought, about how opportunities, challenges, and the outcomes of
plans will unfold over time.
Third, the preferred narratives selected are those which, in
Bruner's (1985) terms, evoke a sense of “verisimilitude.” This sense of
a narrative “feeling right” is not just cognitive but also emotional
(Chong & Tuckett, 2015). As we will see, how this “feeling right”
comes about has crucial consequences.
We make our argument for the value of this approach as follows.
First, we outline key characteristics of radical uncertainty and the
central problem they pose for the development of the conviction to
act. Second, we discuss the role of narratives and the feelings they
evoke in mediating between available “data” sources to create re-
presentations of the future and combine them in such a way as to
produce action under uncertainty. Third, we explore the role that
ambivalence, whether consciously noticed or not, must play in de-
ciding and acting, in contexts of radical uncertainty about the future
and the future outcomes of plans. Fourth, we elaborate CNT, which
we suggest is a promising and practically useful framework for
foresight studies and for research into future‐oriented decisions and
action. Fifth, we introduce two paradigmatic states emerging from
CNT in which ambivalence tends to be managed and their potential
consequences for foresight, policymaking, corporate decision‐
making, and regulation. The approach provides insight into familiar
problems, such as apparently excess risk‐taking, blind spots, over
focus on a single case and groupthink, and how they might be
avoided.
2 | RADICAL UNCERTAINTY
For Knight (1921), contexts of risk are characterized by knowing the
relevant outcome space and known or knowable probabilities. Con-
texts of uncertainty are qualitatively different. They are characterized
by problems in knowing the space of relevant outcomes, inability to
assign meaningful probabilities and difficulties in categorizing re-
levant entities. Where we use the term “radical uncertainty” in this
study, we use it in this Knightian sense. As Simon (1990) argued, the
point about task and information environments of the kind typically
faced by those making high‐impact decisions such as investments in
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major government programs or major strategic shifts in firms, is that
secure ex ante knowledge is not available (Alvarez & Barney, 2005).
As an example, consider the Finnish one‐time mobile phone
company Nokia. As has been well documented, this company “fell
behind,” “missed big trends,” and “lost time”1 while its competitors
Apple and Samsung, took their market share. New company man-
agement came in and faced up to the certainty of extinction if they
continued unchanged and adapted by “jumping” into an entirely new
and radically uncertain future through a radical strategic renewal in
2013. They divested its mobile phone business and focused on
manufacturing network equipment and software, patent licensing,
and opportunities in wearable technology and the Internet of things.
Senior managers and policy‐makers work quite routinely on such
contexts of ill‐specified alternatives and outcome spaces, unknown
risks and complexity (Levinthal, 2011). Not only will they, therefore,
struggle to assign meaningful probabilities, but they will also face the
constant problem of categorizing and framing the entities and their
relations which they need to understand and forecast. In developing
his contrast between risk and uncertainty, Knight argued just this
point. Analysis, he thought, depends upon categorizing the world into
“things, which, under the same circumstances, always behave in the
same way” and for that “the chief logical problem… lies in the con-
ception of a ‘thing’.”; noting that “It is manifest that the ordinary
objects of experience do not fit this description closely”
(Knight, 1921, pp. 204–205).
Choice in a probabilistic universe, with a known outcome space,
can be normatively “rational,” in the sense of calculating an optimal
approach. However, as Bell (1983, p. 8) notes “[the] future is a field of
uncertainty.” Facing radical uncertainty in a competitive marketplace,
firms, like Nokia in the example above, might try to draw on
boundedly rational small world2 representations of large world pro-
blems to seize opportunities, react to threats, and innovate, if they
are to survive. Policy makers too might draw on simple small world
representations to engage the future in the face of uncertainty and
wicked social problems. But they will constantly face the prospect of
having misread their strengths and weaknesses, misread the way
events will unfold, or misread the need to update their representa-
tions (Feduzi et al., 2020; Levinthal, 2011). This dilemma posed by
uncertainty is irresolvable through normatively rational calculation.
Thus, a primary challenge for research is to ask how, faced with
radical uncertainty, managers and policymakers develop and share a
sufficient sense of conviction, in the rightness of a plan, to act; while also
remaining open to new information and new interpretations which
threaten to overturn that conviction.
3 | IMAGINATION AND NARRATIVE IN
NAVIGATING UNCERTAIN FUTURES
As Milojević and Inayatullah (2015) describe, while narrative ap-
proaches have always been an important element of futures work,
there has been a strong recent turn to narrative approaches in fu-
tures and foresight research and practice. Paschen and Ison (2014)
have called for a broad shift to a “narrative paradigm” placing nar-
rative research, for example, at the heart of climate change adapta-
tion work, to open up spaces for innovative governance.
Story‐telling as a means of planning has been identified as among
the uniquely human tools (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007) that allow us to
make sense, close information gaps (Golman et al., 2017, 2021), order
information to assist prediction and thinking ahead (Beach, 2021),
and to communicate and gossip. However, narratives can also sup-
port us in avoiding or discounting information to maintain valued
beliefs and social identity (Golman et al., 2017; Rayner, 2012).
Within psychology, the significance of narrative as a cognitive
process is reflected in recent developments in the neurological study
of episodic memory and we can now identify a narrative subsystem in
the brain distinct from language capabilities (Mar, 2004; Rubin, 2006).
Such contributions support Bruner's (1990) identification of the
centrality of narrative in organizing human experience and memory
and Beach's (2009) theory of narrative thought in which he refers to
narrative as providing a dynamic, ever‐evolving chronicle of ongoing
experience, linking memory of the past, perception of the present,
and expectations about the future.
As Beach (2021) notes, although philosophers and physicists
have struggled with the reality of time and causality, the brain has
evolved ways to treat both as true (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011;
Lagnado, 2011; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015; Sobel & Kirkham, 2006).
Important as these and other contributions emphasizing the role
of narrative in thinking and decision‐making have been (e.g.,
Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Graesser et al., 1994; Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Pennington & Hastie, 1992), they leave the crucial
role narrative plays in facilitating action under uncertainty under‐
theorized.
A starting point here is the work of Jens Beckert (2016). He puts
narrative at the heart of the way actors in a modern economy must
develop action based on future expectations. As he sees it, acts of
individual and collective imagination are necessary to respond to
competitive forces in a modern economy. As Knight observed, these
acts of agency must necessarily produce dynamic and uncertain
outcomes. Therefore, acts of narrative imagination—“imaginaries” or
“fictional expectations” are central drivers which both help navigate
uncertainty and contribute to uncertainty about a future that has yet
to be made. Decisions are “creative responses to situations that are
based on contingent interpretations of what the future holds…”
(Beckert, 2016, p. 36).
Lane and Maxfield's (2005) interview and observation study of
Echelon, a US start‐up which manufactured wafer‐thin electronic
chips with integrated software, illustrates how shared narratives,
which Beckert terms “imaginaries,” enable organizations to make
choices under what Lane and Maxfield called ontological uncertainty.
What Echelon executives did was to select an imagined narrative for
their firm's future that made sense of their complex situation and
fitted their goals and the local social relations in which they found
themselves. In this way, the narrative showed them a path ahead.
The firm had a new technology with which it hoped to re-
volutionize the large market for electronic control of air conditioning,
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heating, and other distributed devices. Ultimately successful in its
ambitious aim to compete with and perhaps eventually replace the
established players, Lane and Maxwell argue the company founders
steered their decision‐making via narratives of the future, in part
generated by heuristically constructed analogies fitted to their ex-
perience. For example, initially, some in top management began with
a story that the way forward was to sell their product through es-
tablished large companies. It proved difficult and threatened to make
them dependent on those with whom they wished to compete.
When another narrative emerged, via a sales employee charged
with developing a training course for those using new technology, it
attracted them as a preferred alternative. The idea was to sell direct
via the many small independent contractors who were in the habit of
customizing the big companies' existing control equipment with their
own software fixes. The approach gained traction when the em-
ployee enlisted allies from the engineering group (who were primarily
attracted because the solution required them to design another new
product) and then took his idea to the CEO. The latter recognized
elements of the story from past success in quite different fields.
Moreover, he noticed it was an opportunity to move the markets
toward another of his goals: interoperability.
Initially attracted in these ways, the CEO tested out the idea by
visiting three of the independent contractors (identified by the em-
ployee). He quickly recognized the owner of one of the companies to
be the counterpart of someone that had played a paramount role in
the most important success story of his business life. It fitted the
current situation to a known success story in the same way profes-
sional investors try to repeat past success by finding a new situation
in which the potential narrative looks to them or colleagues in their
social network like the old one (D. Tuckett, 2011).
In this way, the independent contractor narrative became com-
pelling across a coalition of Echelon actors. Moreover, via this
strategy, rather than be subservient to the existing large players,
Echelon's goal to “take control of its destiny” was evoked. The nar-
rative gave the desired sense of being in control, avoiding at least one
dependence aspect of uncertainty and was, therefore, highly attrac-
tive. Action could follow.
Several features of a logic of decision‐making, and its social and
informational context, can be seen in this example. Echelon's deci-
sions reflect data both gained and interpreted from the external
world, including the social environment and internally derived goals.
Executives had to form a coalition willing to commit to action over an
uncertain period. They had no probabilities available to model
meaningfully. But they could form and propagate beliefs, based on
their prior “knowledge” and new evidence. Thus, they could char-
acterize what they thought likely to happen, given what they “ima-
gined” about the potential actions of others around.
Data, interpretations, goals, beliefs and imagined futures, were
relevant elements for decision‐making hanging around in their social
environment in narrative form. The narrative eventually selected to
underpin strategy allowed these elements to be represented in a
format that could be combined with their values to guide their
choices. This evolving narrative was, both the output of their
reasoning process for judging outcome and an input into it (Johnson
et al., 2021). In this way, their narrative solved their need to create
internal representations that, through sense‐making, “mediated” be-
tween the external world and internal decision. It provided a process,
a driver of action that could combine beliefs and goals to yield
committed action.
As the Echelon example also illustrates, memories are not stored
but storied. There is evidence suggesting we remember the past
through narrative reconstruction and we imagine futures through the
same mental systems and narrative capacities (Schacter et al., 2008);
evoking what Suddendorf and Corballis have referred to as “mental
time travel” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf et al., 2009).
This mental time travel is not a purely intellectual exercise but an
embodied process. Through narrative, we cast our bodies into the
future and experience the visceral emotional consequences of our
simulated plans and actions. As Küpers et al. (2013, p. 85) describe,
“[n]arratives are rooted in and processed through the living, feeling,
and signifying bodies that interact with their respective worlds.”
Narratives offer continuous interpretations of our lives together,
our futures and our motivations as a profoundly social species. They
depend, for success, on social action, and are an ongoing social and
cultural accomplishment. As in the Echelon example, narrative ca-
pacities include the capacity to explain ourselves and to draw on
other's narratives; and provide a means for sense‐making and sense‐
giving in relation to challenges we face. They convey and adapt
shared cultural responses to those challenges. They embed causal
dynamics and chronological ordering (Tuomi, 2019; Vaara
et al., 2016). Crucially, they are not just a means to persuade an
audience but play a central role in how the storyteller develops their
own conviction. As we now go on to explore, emotions play a central
role in narrative thought and in translating narratives to action.
4 | EMOTIONS ARE NECESSARY
ELEMENTS OF NARRATIVE
Emotion, linked to multiple brain systems and to the embodied nature
of cognition, is accepted as a fundamental element in human cogni-
tion and central to attention, perception, decision‐making and action
in large areas of neuroscience, psycholinguistics, and psychology
(Lakoff, 2012; Phelps, 2006). However, it has until recently received
modest attention in research on high‐impact decision‐making or
discussion of the role of narratives in imagining futures.
Strategy scholars have shown increasing interest in this im-
portant area (e.g., Healey & Hodgkinson, 2017; Huang et al., 2019;
Huy & Zott, 2019; Vuori & Huy, 2016), although much remains to be
done. Within policy research, there has been some turn to treating
the role of emotion seriously in more critical accounts of policy-
making (e.g., Newman, 2012). However, as Anderson (2016, p. 86)
notes, emotion is a significant but largely neglected element of the
reasoning process in policymaking, and “surprisingly little interroga-
tion of the everyday meaning of emotion to policy participants has
taken place among policy and politics scholars.”
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Despite a recent strong focus on narrative in futures and fore-
sight work, interest in narrative foresight has been somewhat lagged
by recognition of the crucial role of emotions in assembling, selecting,
and acting on narratives. For example, one of the more influential
contributions to narrative foresight work has been CLA. A search
through the seminal CLA Reader (Inayatullah, 2004) finds just one
mention of emotion (in relation to its role in myth and metaphor).
The more recent “CLA 2.0” publication (Inayatullah &
Milojevic, 2015) shows greater engagement with the role of emo-
tions. Multiple contributors to the book recognize the ubiquity of
emotion in foresight practice (e.g., Shevellar, 2015) and the central
role of emotions in helping people connect with a collective narrative
and being moved to action (e.g., Spencer & Salvatico, 2015). How-
ever, there is significant scope for improving the theorization of the
interconnectedness between narrative, emotion, and action in
CLA, and other approaches to narrative foresight. In particular,
we will argue for attention to the central facilitating role of emotions
in narrative thought, both as action tendencies and attention
filters.
Solms (2021) provides an accessible neuroscience summary of
the central role of feelings (i.e., conscious emotion) as they are un-
derstood in recent work. The two key findings for our purposes are
(1) it is feelings in all mammals that prioritize which of their poten-
tially conflicting needs to satisfy in any context; and (2) that it is also
feelings, produced by surprise (Solms & Friston, 2018), that cause
humans to modify their prior expectations of the situations they find
themselves in, and their normative approach; bringing their cortical
functioning to bear to explore the manifest uncertainty and to ela-
borate a response. To implement prioritization and responses to
“surprise,” feelings are significantly registered as present in the core
executive areas of the brain, for example, in the mid brain and
especially in the periaqueductal gray (PAG), as well as in other net-
works. In fact, almost any human task, including answering a ques-
tion, evokes their activation.
Such advances in brain understanding dispel the (Western) folk
idea that emotion and cognition are separate and rival processes; an
idea that has had a strong influence on much work on judgment and
decision‐making research (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). Rather they are
intertwined at all stages from perception to action (Lerner
et al., 2015; Phelps, 2006; Phelps et al., 2014). Importantly for our
purpose, emotions are linked to approach/avoidance motivation and
behavior at multiple levels from the primitive primary emotional
system of the brain through learning processes to higher order cog-
nitions (Panksepp, 2013; Rolls, 2013). Thus, not only base affective
orientations but also higher order emotions with complex cognitive
appraisal elements may be understood as mechanisms for mediating
approach behaviors to rewarding opportunities and avoidance be-
haviors to aversive threats3. Emotions are action tendencies in the
way that they motivate approach and avoidance behaviors, and they
are mechanisms for the management of attention, intimately involved
in how we select, and process information, and engage appropriate
responses. Schoemaker (2019) has recently highlighted the central
importance of attention processes in foresight work. Given the
central role of emotion in attention processes, this suggests that the
role of emotions in foresight work deserves greater consideration.
Importantly for foresight work, as for any decision‐making under
uncertainty, there is clear evidence that emotions are felt, not only in
response to actually present situations, but to imagined situations. For
instance, in understanding literature, although we know that a si-
tuation is not real, we nonetheless experience emotions (Mar
et al., 2010).
In understanding others' minds, we imagine what we would think
and feel were we in their shoes (Mitchell et al., 2005). We can also
experience emotional reactions to imagined futures that are the
output of narrative simulations (Richard et al., 1996). This is how
emotions felt “inside” a narrative (which is imaginary) manifest “out-
side” the narrative and affect real‐world decision‐making.
The Echelon narrative is an example of how under radical un-
certainty, when meaningful probabilities are not available, heuristics—
simple rules relying on a small number of cues, such as the past
experiences of the CEO, are used to evaluate narratives; including
cues exploiting the causal, analogical, and temporal structure em-
bedded in narratives. The role of feelings is to implement selection as
part of the “mediation” process described above. Each narrative
element eventually combined into an action narrative feels right, in
part via social process. Moreover, feelings are again relevant in the
“combination process.”
Simulation itself cannot assign meaning. But action narratives can
be simulated mentally, to imagine future consequences of action
affectively as well as cognitively. In this way, the future is available to
be appraised through our emotional responses to that future, which
combine beliefs with values. In narrative simulation, emotions such as
excitement, fear, shame, and anxiety accompany anticipations of
future outcomes or of the chosen means we have selected to get to
them, motivating us to approach or avoid acts causing those out-
comes (Elliot, 2006).
Vuori and Huy's (2016, 2020) longitudinal case study research on
Nokia provides a relevant example of the way emotions, and their
effect on attention, influence decision‐making, in this case dis-
astrously. Drawing on extensive interviews they found that top and
middle managers' shared emotions during the smartphone innovation
process caused cycles of behaviors that harmed both the process and
its outcome. Differing types of shared fear between top managers
and middle managers profoundly affected how attention was allo-
cated and information was interpreted. Top managers were afraid of
external competitors and shareholders, while middle managers were
mainly afraid of internal groups, including superiors and peers. Top
managers' externally focused fear led them to exert pressure on
middle managers without fully revealing the severity of the external
threats and to interpret middle managers' communications in ways
biased by their prior conceptions. Middle managers' internally fo-
cused fear reduced their tendency to share negative information with
top managers, leading top managers to be poorly informed, and
biased by their prior conceptions, so that they developed an overly
optimistic perception of their organization's technological capabilities
and neglected long‐term investments in developing innovation.
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A particular feature of this period was the avoidance of uncomfortable
knowledge, driven by the avoidance of ambivalence. As one senior
manager interviewed in the research noted in relation to the market
decline of phones using their Symbian operating system “no one on an
emotional level wanted to think about it right away, even though
analytically [top managers] knew [that the prevailing strategy should
be challenged]. The consequences were emotionally burdening. We
didn't want to deal with them” (Vuori & Huy, 2020, p. 14).
5 | THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF
AMBIVALENCE AND CONVICTION
Uncertainty can be paralyzing. The proverbial Buridan's ass could not
choose between two equidistant haystacks and starved to death
(Sen, 2003). Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) document how a senior
team they supported though a scenario planning process failed to
engage the uncertainties they faced, deploying a range of individual
and organizational defenses to avoid decisive action.
High‐stakes decisions often have strong arguments for and
against the same position, producing ambivalence (Armitage &
Conner, 2000; Festinger, 1962; Rucker et al., 2014; Smelser, 1998).
For example, investing in the stock market after a crash could be
hugely profitable (if the market recovers) or hugely costly (if it con-
tinues to crash). Compounding this, high‐stakes decisions often un-
fold over long periods, requiring lengthy commitments. Likewise,
preparing for a pandemic requires sustained investment for years,
with no sense of when (if ever) it will pay off. Conviction is critical.
But conviction is also dangerous: Decision‐makers who stick to
their guns regardless of the evidence fare no better than those who
vacillate at every turn. Thus, an important function of emotions is to
manage conviction—gaining conviction to act even when every option
has strong arguments for and against, maintaining conviction to
commit to a sustained decision over time in the face of unfolding
information, and moderating conviction when the evidence reaches a
sufficient threshold to reverse course. We become emotionally at-
tached to a particular futures scenario, investment, or romantic
partner, to gain and maintain confidence in strategic, financial, or
romantic decisions in the face of conflicting reasons and short‐term
variability. Yet excessive or unreflective conviction yields disaster.
Conviction is both cognitive and affective. It is built through
narratives that integrate evidence and expectations with emotional
support for a preferred choice. For example, the narratives un-
covered in Tuckett's (2011) interview studies of money managers
revealed two key conviction‐generating strategies (Chong &
Tuckett, 2015). First, 90% of respondents cited at least one narrative
containing attractors—belief that an entity was attractive because it
provided an exceptional opportunity for gain, either because the re-
spondent felt they had special insight or because the entity itself was
special (e.g., due to exceptional products). Second, 88% of re-
spondents cited at least one narrative classified as doubt‐repellors
that served to reduce anxiety, either because it capped uncertainty
(e.g., due to competent management) or downside surprise.
Decision‐making in the face of recognized uncertainty is anxiety
and excitement generating. On the one hand, excitement, the reward
system, is triggered by opportunity. If not, nothing happens. On the
other hand, anxiety is triggered by the need to approach reward in
the face of potential threat. Both approach and avoidance emotions
are necessarily aroused by the thought of action, insofar as the lim-
ited information about potential rewards and harms is recognized.
This “felt” ambivalence triggers the behavioral inhibition system and
the anxiety associated with significant potential goal conflicts (Gray &
McNaughton, 2003).
In the short‐term, anxiety is functional, activating search and
vigilance. However, it is an aversive state; there is a strong motivation
to quickly resolve the goal conflict that is generating anxiety. This
may be through emotion‐focused defense and coping mechanisms
which downplay the conflict or, alternatively through problem‐
focused approaches which seek to resolve it (Ashforth et al., 2014).
In the face of radical uncertainty, any plan or consequential
narrative about the future, should evoke ambivalence; the presence
of conflicting cognitions and conflicting emotions which respond to
both the attractive possibilities and the potential aversive outcomes.4
However, the extent to which ambivalence is consciously experi-
enced depends crucially on the sensemaking process by which meaning is
created or restored in the face of uncertainty and breaches of expecta-
tions. Ambivalence may often be avoided through defenses involving
selective inattention which bypass experienced uncertainty.
In both psychological and sociological accounts, ambivalence has
primarily been considered a condition to be avoided, as it is often an
aversive state, arousing feelings of anxiety. Further, some studies
suggest that ambivalence leads to cognitive inflexibility, amplification
and polarization of views (Rothman et al., 2017).
However, as Rothman et al. note, evidence is also building that, in
many contexts, experienced ambivalence facilitates positive out-
comes; including increased cognitive flexibility, greater breadth of
attention, even‐handed consideration of divergent perspectives,
creativity, and collective and individual adaptability. In the context of
sensemaking Vogus et al. (2014) argue that “[e]motional ambivalence
enables mindful organizing by making individuals more open to al-
ternative perspectives … and enhancing the cognitive flexibility …
needed to anticipate failures and effectively respond to the un-
expected” (p. 593).
The negative impacts of ambivalence are primarily associated
with defenses and coping strategies which close it off. These include
downplaying or denigrating formerly valued objects, goals or aspects
of identity, selective attention, and polarization of attitudes and
emotions (Ashforth et al., 2014), vacillation, and over‐simplification
(see Rothman et al., 2017, for a review). In contrast, the positive
impacts of ambivalence, are associated with the tolerance of am-
bivalence and curiosity about the learning it affords.
We suggest that the crucial point here is not the existence of
ambivalence, which must always be present in the face of un-
certainty. Rather, what matters is the conscious awareness and toler-
ance of doubts and ambivalence, and especially open curiosity about
what provokes them, versus the tendency to repress ambivalence to
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avoid the anxiety it provokes. As Fong (2006, p. 1019) suggests,
experienced ambivalence “signals that it may be necessary or adap-
tive to process stimuli in this environment in a flexible, multifaceted
way, and to be on the watch for new associations.” We return to this
point in the penultimate section.
6 | FINDING THE CONVICTION TO ACT
CNT is a theory of decision‐making under radical uncertainty (Chong
& Tuckett, 2015; Johnson et al., 2021; D. A. Tuckett & Nikolic, 2017;
D. Tuckett et al., 2020) that builds on the propositions presented so
far about narrative, emotion, and ambivalence.
It posits that the mental substrate underlying decisions made in
radical uncertainty is a narrative, a summary representation of re-
levant causal, temporal, analogical, and normative information. Nar-
ratives support four inter‐related psychological processes:
1. explanation (imposing structure on the current situation that yields
a sense of understanding and emotional satisfaction);
2. mental simulation (‘running’ the narrative forward in time to gen-
erate imagined futures associated with a given choice);
3. affective evaluation (reacting emotionally to imagined futures
to evaluate their desirability and manage commitment over
time); and
4. communication (coordinating action through justification and
persuasion, with narratives propagating across social networks).
In everyday situations characterized by uncertainty and fuzzy eva-
luation, we make sustained decisions that we think and feel appropriate
using socially shared narratives that facilitate sense‐making and
imagination.
As indicated in the Echelon example, conviction narratives
emerge from and are improved by social debate (Mercier &
Sperber, 2017), whether this is the result of actual discussion or
anticipated discussion in people's minds. Thus, each of the narrative
components are treated as more, or less, convincing within the social
environments of different policy, industry, and management groups.
Figure 1 sets out components within a narrative5 that might cause it
to be selected to support a particular set of actions by building a pre-
ponderance of approach versus avoidance emotion to develop the con-
viction to act. We saw some of this in the Echelon example—the action to
be decided about was novel and might or might not work out; there were
at least two completely different alternatives and no reliable way of de-
ciding which would be preferable; the decision required mastery of local
social and political processes and was made in social interaction; the
preferred action was one that could be fitted to a “known” narrative with
an implicit causal pattern recognized as valid by actors in the local culture,
particularly attractive because it seemed to offer the right sort of control
of their own destiny; the eventual decision was possible because it
F IGURE 1 Components creating conviction in a narrative
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excited those making it (the proposer, the engineers, the CEO) and also,
through the CEO's visits to independent contractors, provided evidence
that helped to quell doubts and further reduce the feeling of subjective
uncertainty. Moreover, because at these visits the CEO fitted his current
situation to a known success story in his career, excitement in the nar-
rative was amplified.
6.1 | Narrative elements
The first box contains typical elements that may be assembled within
overall narratives. The point is that each element has the potential to
evoke feelings and thoughts, creating approach or avoidance ten-
dencies. Note that the role of some narrative elements in a preferred
conviction narrative is that they repel doubt, perhaps via counter-
factual thought and arguments (Byrne, 2016) or enquiries such as
running checks (Chong & Tuckett, 2015). The dashed arrows back
from approach and avoidance thoughts and emotions indicate their
iterative role in narrative assembly. The dotted line back from action
indicates that narratives may be updated (or not) as action generates
further information.
6.2 | Narrative evaluation
The next box concerns evaluative processes indicated by past research
into developing conviction. They are the means through which ideas put
forward in debate are judged as plausible and reliable, or not, in each case
generating reasons and feelings in their favor, or against.
Conviction has been studied, as attitude certainty (“feeling cer-
tain,” Wan et al., 2009). How particular narrative elements might be
more, or less, influential in developing a subjective feeling of certainty
is likely to be influenced by features identified in attitude certainty
research. Four features supporting a feeling of attitude certainty (or
conviction) have been identified repeatedly:
6.2.1 | Familiarity or pattern recognition effects
Narratives which include subjectively recognized or familiar patterns
enhance conviction (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Koriat &
Levy‐Sadot, 2001). Intuition as a means of decision‐making rests on
pattern recognition (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Sinclair &
Ashkanasy, 2005) which is emotionally mediated in interaction with
memory (Chassy & Gobet, 2011).
6.2.2 | Congruency effects
Narratives perceived to be congruent with actors' own ways of thinking
and ascribing causality have a better chance of being perceived to be
accurate than those that seem “foreign” (Rucker et al., 2014). DiMaggio's
(1997) analysis of the links between culture and cognition suggests that
the experienced accuracy and relevance of narrative components will
influence and be influenced by social interaction. Narrative elements are
deeply socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985).
6.2.3 | Legitimacy effects
Information suggesting that actions are desirable, appropriate, or
proper in relation to locally relevant norms, values, and beliefs is
usually treated as more reliable (Suchman, 1995; Tormala
et al., 2009).
6.2.4 | Importance effects
Narratives based on information that is perceived as locally im-
portant, competent or authoritative are more likely to generate at-
titude certainty (e.g., Boninger et al., 1995).
6.3 | Trustworthiness effects
These concern research findings suggesting that information and
explanation relevant to narratives or the choice of heuristic (etc.) can
be weighted differently according to where it is believed to come
from. There are credibility effects and consensus effects.
6.3.1 | Credibility effects
Information from a locally reputed and trusted source, including from
one's own expertize, is felt more accurate (Malshe, 2010; Tormala &
Petty, 2004).
6.3.2 | Consensus effects
Narratives or parts of narratives shared with a subject's social comparison
group foster a subjective feeling of accuracy. Social consensus and social
expectations (such as ideas about avoiding future blame) play a key role in
creating confidence in personal beliefs (Visser & Mirabile, 2004).
6.4 | Presentational effects
These reflect a large body of social psychology research on fluency and
related effects. Such work has focused on how information presentation
influences attitude certainty and so judgement and debate in determining
a preferred narrative. Such influences include processing fluency (Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009; Song & Schwarz, 2009); accessibility (Bizer
et al., 2006; Petrocelli et al., 2007); apparent effortfulness of information
collection and processing (Smith et al., 2008; Wan et al., 2010), and
perceived completeness of information (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994;
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Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Priester et al., 2007; Wood, 1982; Wood
et al., 1995).
In short, the way narrative components are presented, in fore-
sight work and strategy debate, in organizations, and by who, is likely
to make a difference to felt reliability and truth. As we have argued,
these elements produce not just thoughts but feelings.
6.5 | The role of ambivalence
As narratives are built and modified iteratively the balance between ap-
proach and avoidance emotions shifts. The preferred conviction narrative
is one which produces sufficient dominance of approach emotions over
avoidance; supporting action by telling a story which exchanges a situa-
tion of uncertainty about the imagined outcomes of different manage-
ment strategies for a situation of felt conviction in the preferred policy or
strategy.
We next consider the processes through which the ambivalence
generated by uncertainty is managed, as conviction is developed. As
we have discussed, ambivalence generates anxiety which may be
resolved either through emotion‐focused defense and coping me-
chanisms which downplay the conflict or through problem‐focused
approaches which seek to resolve it (Ashforth et al., 2014).
Important recent work has been done on the regulation of emotions
in organizations, for example on the importance of emotion regulation in
strategy processes and processes of social emotion regulation (Healey &
Hodgkinson, 2017; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Vuori & Huy, 2020).
Such contributions have emphasized both the role of techniques for the
downregulation of strategic anxiety, and of the upregulation of interest
and enthusiasm to build openness to new prospects (e.g., Healey &
Hodgkinson, 2017). However, less attention has been paid to, what we
identify as a core challenge, the role of the conflicting emotions asso-
ciated with the ambivalence generated by uncertainty.
In the following section, we address this important question of
how the ambivalence, doubts and anxieties, generated by un-
certainty, are managed in individuals and organizations.
7 | TWO PARADIGMATIC STATES AND
THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
CNT alters the focus of thinking about decision‐making away from
the challenge of how to get it right, ex ante, toward the challenge of
enquiring into how you become convinced in your chosen path for-
wards, as the Echelon and Nokia managements had to do; although
you can not know it's going to work. We suggest this is not only a
more useful approach for decision‐makers than the prevailing ideol-
ogy of optimization but also, a less dangerous one, which allows more
constructive learning from "mistakes.”
CNT postulates two paradigmatic states in which narratives gain
conviction: Integrated (Is) or Divided (Ds) states. The two terms were
originally introduced to research how market actors manage ambivalent
thoughts and specifically to account for the characteristics of conviction
formation and then disintegration during financial bubbles (Tuckett, 2011;
Tuckett & Taffler, 2008). We extend this conceptualization from a pri-
mary focus on individuals' mindsets to include forms of organizing and
organizational routines. Is and Ds are two different modes of feeling,
thinking, and organizing, reflecting different approaches to managing
doubt and anxiety that we expect to find at work in the processes that
create conviction in strategy narratives.
7.1 | Integrated state
Is is the state of affairs envisaged in normative theories of science
based on experimentation and/or inference; strategic actors are
curious, a broad range of information and perspectives, both sup-
porting and challenging plans and actions are considered; and it is
recognized that there are uncertainties and contradictions within the
preferred conviction narrative supporting a strategy or policy. Con-
viction is obtained via connected thoughts which are the outcome of
curiosity and complex analysis and thinking rather than by some form
of suppression of emotions, options, and arguments. Crucially, the
ambivalent feelings that go with thoughts, such as simultaneous fear
and excitement, are tolerated. Hence feedback and enquiry me-
chanisms (perhaps groups empowered to keep doubting) can be put
in place organizationally and used to monitor assumptions and de-
velopments, whether they produce anxiety or not.
An integrated state requires the ability to tolerate the feeling of
“not knowing.” which has sometimes been given a more subtle for-
mulation by using the poet Keats' idea of negative capability: “I mean
Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in un-
certainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after
fact & reason” (Keats & Milnes, 1848, p. 71). Or put another way,
“precisely the ability to tolerate anxiety and fear, to stay in the place
of uncertainty in order to allow for the emergence of new thoughts
or perceptions” (Eisold, 2000, p. 65). For example, Fenton‐O'Creevy
et al. (2005) highlight the willingness among high performing in-
vestment bank traders, in comparison to lower performers, to toler-
ate doubts and mixed emotions in the face of uncertainty and stay
curious about alternative perspectives.
Simpson et al. (2002) use the concept of negative capability
when describing the challenges faced by a large British company,
“Megacom,” which was trying to negotiate a risky but potentially
large and profitable new venture between themselves and companies
in Russia, China, and South Korea. They describe how, over a long
period, the CEO reported that he had to tolerate the feelings pro-
voked by uncertainty to set aside his previous certainties (and per-
suade his board to). He had to drop many assumptions about people
in the other teams and their motives and modus operandi and learn to
listen and become curious about them and their arguments afresh.
From this stance, he became able to broker agreements and to gain
trust and authority. Allowing a state of “not knowing” or negative
capability, despite huge pressure to decide and get things agreed,
argue Simpson et al., creates the conditions for curiosity, knowledge
co‐construction, trust between partners, and sustained agreement.
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A capacity for maintaining ambivalence may also be structured
into organizational routines, structures, and other arrangements. For
example, the New York Fed has established an “Applied Critical
Thinking” unit, whose job, is to surface doubts about basic assump-
tions behind key policy decisions. A crucial feature is that they report
directly to the bank president (Torres, 2019). In Is, new information
and perspectives are sought out and then lead to curiosity and dis-
cussion; and perhaps to updating strategy, for example, via organi-
zational structures and routines such as in the New York Fed.
In Is, doubt repellor elements of narrative typically concern active
checks to resolve doubts. For, example, Maitland and Sammartino
(2015) describe the concerns of an Australian mining firm about
political hazards in a planned acquisition in an African state that had
not long since ended a civil war. A key concern was whether they
could operate without making corrupt payments. Lacking conclusive
information or resources to develop a timely and comprehensive
understanding of corruption risks, they adopted a key heuristic:
whether other MNEs had been able to operate without making
corrupt payments. Investigation of this question acted as a key doubt
repellor.
Tuckett's notion of integrated state is close to what Ashforth
et al. (2014), describe as an attitude of wisdom, “where actors bal-
ance confidence with doubt, ready to act as if they know and yet as if
they do not know. Cast in the terminology of ambivalence, ‘knowing’
and ‘doubting’ are opposite orientations held simultaneously”
(p. 1465). Although Tuckett, in line with earlier discussions about
brain functioning, stresses that Is is an emotional as well as cognitive
state.
Similarly, Grossmann et al. (2019) focus on wise reasoning; de-
fined by them as “epistemic humility, recognition of a world in flux/
change, self‐transcendence, recognition of diverse perspectives on an
issue, search for integration of diverse perspectives” (p. 805). In a
series of diary and experimental studies, they show these to be
supported by more diverse and balanced emotions, as opposed to the
dominance of a single emotional state.
7.2 | Divided state
Ds, on the other hand, is a simplistic rather than complex state in
which potentially relevant ideas are disconnected by forms of cog-
nitive and emotional, or organizational defenses. Emotions are po-
larized to either approach or avoidance, and data, ideas, sources,
opinions, narratives, and the various features that go into a convic-
tion narrative receive attention only if they evoke that side of the
ambivalence. Accounts, data, opinions, theories, emotions, and
thoughts that do not fit exist in a disconnected and ignored state and
do not count. In this state, doubts are typically repelled through se-
lective individual and organizational inattention.
For example, Homburg and Fürst (2007) have documented how
defensive organizational routines may insulate managers from cus-
tomer complaints. To give another example, during the dotcom boom
companies raised large sums from investors with lengthy
prospectuses describing potential difficulties. These received scant
attention. A narrative generating inflated expectations about dot-
coms (“phantastic objects”: D. Tuckett & Taffler, 2008) had devel-
oped, accompanied by a polarization to approach emotions. Research
subsequently demonstrated that the addition of the suffix.com raised
valuations during the boom, whereas its removal raised valuations
after the bust (Cooper et al., 2001, 2005). Similarly in his discussion
of the “social construction of ignorance” Rayner (2012) highlights
how organizations often avoid uncomfortable knowledge through
strategies of denial, dismissal, diversion, and displacement.
There is promising work suggesting that such states may be
measurable. For example, Nyman et al. (2021) have shown how al-
gorithmic text analysis of large data sets may be able to help central
banks to identify the emergence of divided states threatening fi-
nancial stability.
The crucial feature of Ds is that it is a state in which information
is attended to in an unbalanced way; driven by polarized emotions,
information favorable to the current belief trend is noticed, un-
favorable information is unnoticed or discounted. This selective at-
tention might be driven by feeling states. Unfavorable information in
respect of current beliefs generates avoidance feelings and can be
disavowed for significant lengths of time. Alternatively, social me-
chanisms, such as organizational structure, culture, routines, and
processes, may act to reduce ambivalence and anxiety, influencing
the willingness to enquire.
For example, it is common for organizations to manage the an-
xiety of key uncertainties associated with a planned strategy by
committing to future review. Under Ds we would expect that such
review may often function in a largely ceremonial fashion, failing to
recover or represent the initial ambivalent thoughts and emotions
and associated anxiety.
Another example would be the way that prevailing political
processes and power relations within an organization often reduce
ambivalence by silencing voices that challenge framings of an orga-
nization's context; thus resisting narratives of uncertainty that chal-
lenge powerful actors perspectives (Wilson et al., 2010).
We suggest that if a policy or strategy is supported by a narrative
formed in Ds, then ideas and information that challenge the narrative
will be ignored or rationalized away. Routines and defenses which
avoid ambivalence and anxiety will prevent learning and adjustment.
In Ds ambivalent feelings are subjectively intolerable to both in-
dividuals and groups captured by this type of functioning. Both in-
dividual (Pratt & Crosina, 2016) and group methods of defense
against anxiety are well established. The latter leading to the term
groupthink (Baron, 2005; Janis, 1982). Useful work has also been
done on defensive routines in organizations (e.g., A. D. Brown &
Starkey, 2000; Rayner, 2012).
The main point is that whether in individual, group, or organi-
zational contexts, defensive procedures are used to isolate or ratio-
nalize anxiety‐provoking information and perspectives and maintain
current beliefs untouched (De Klerk, 2017).
The Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank argued ideologically
over competing narratives to explain the unfolding events of
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2007–2008, ignoring links between the macroeconomy and finance,
present in their own documents (Fligstein et al., 2017), as well as
other signals of financial strain; this forced the Governor to delay
intervention before the crisis (Abolafia, 2020). Many Nokia execu-
tives failing to grapple effectively with the threat of Apple, most
holders of Dotcom stocks, politicians and officials failing to notice the
importance of protective clothing and logistics in responding to the
COVID‐19 pandemic and most buyers of complex sub‐prime mort-
gage derivatives seem to have functioned in Ds.
Recent research suggests that to turn Nokia around required
what might be called emotion work before they were able to gen-
erate and act on a new narrative that saw them exiting the mobile
phone market and focusing on alternative opportunities. For ex-
ample, new ways of talking and listening to each other aimed at
building trust and cooperation, were instituted; routines supporting
consideration of a much wider range of potential futures were in-
troduced (Vuori & Huy, 2018).
It remains to be seen whether the UK government, will be willing
to recognize the nature of the divided state that led to the number 1
risk on the National Risk Register (a pandemic) being associated with
contingency plans (e.g., to purchase PPE or vaccine manufacturing
capacity as needed in real time) that any foresight exercise examining
multiple scenarios would very rapidly have found wanting. Crisis and
disease prevention are two areas of uncertainty about future threats
and hazards where Ds is a tempting solution to policy conflict.
Conviction or adjustment built in Ds, which we would expect to
be less well founded, would exhibit such tell‐tale signs as: support
from a limited range of information sources; absence of relevant
detail; absence of evidence that alternative perspectives have been
deeply considered; ritualistic use of modeling techniques to produce
“a number”; absence of considering the kinds of “big surprise”
(Thompson & Smith, 2019) that may not be encompassed by narra-
tives or models; lack of organizational transparency, use of a narrow
range of expertize, discounting or avoiding ways of getting relevant
feedback and inattention to weak signals on how key variables vital
to success are evolving.
We can notice whether the narratives in discourse, memos, emails, or
other communications contain a balance of both approach and avoidance
emotions, if there are changes in these emotions, and whether they are
sustained and in what direction. We can also look at the extent to which
building in relevant feedback to test core assumptions as events unfold is
included in the decision6 and at the emotional content of the feedback
data coming in as well as the search activity undertaken before decisions
or any revisions to decisions.
8 | CONCLUSION
8.1 | Our contribution
Much foresight work has been preoccupied with the significant
challenges of helping organizations and policymakers avoid what the
novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has called “the danger of a single
story” (Adichie, 2009). Approaches to this problem include techni-
ques for deconstructing taken for granted narratives, frames and
assumptions about past present and future (Inayatullah &
Milojevic, 2015), and the use of scenario techniques as a tool for
“disciplined imagination” (Schoemaker, 1997). We suggest that CNT
adds significant insights to this body of work, through its systematic
account of the role of emotion in the processes by which narratives
are formed, elaborated, and motivate action.
In this paper, we have started with the individual and organiza-
tional challenges of foresight; that is, adequately considering alter-
native futures and alternative outcomes for plans, strategies, and
policies. We have suggested that, in the face of radical uncertainty, a
central question concerns how strategy and policy makers develop
the conviction to act while remaining open (or not) to information and
perspectives which may overthrow that conviction.
In exploring this question, we have highlighted the important
roles played by emotions, ambivalence (whether tolerated or sup-
pressed), and embodied narrative reasoning. We go beyond extant
work on emotion‐regulation in organizations' decision processes (e.g.,
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Vuori & Huy, 2020), to highlight the
importance of the tolerance of ambivalence and constructive doubt.
We propose CNT as a valuable framework for integrating and ad-
vancing these insights and develop it further as an account of an
embodied and socially embedded narrative reasoning process
through which organizations and actors within them develop the
conviction to act, despite radical uncertainty.
So where does that leave us in making judgments about the
adequacy of foresight and future oriented decision‐making and ac-
tion ex ante. We delineated two contrasting paradigmatic organiza-
tional and psychological states in which decisions may be made, and
their consequences for the updating of narratives and decisions. We
argued that in conditions of uncertainty where ambivalence must be
present, that suppression of ambivalence and polarization to either
avoidance or approach emotions and thoughts is an important in-
dicator of a state in which doubts are repelled through defensive
routines and selective inattention, and in which the provisionality of
narrative representations is replaced by misplaced concreteness.
Foresight science seeks to innovate beyond the large parts of
decision‐making and modelling science which remain wedded to
precise calculation based on fragile optimality assumptions that leave
them trapped in model land, unable to escape the big “surprises”
uncertainty will sooner or later create (Thompson & Smith, 2019).
However, we have argued that, to achieve this most effectively, more
attention should be paid to the role of ambivalent emotions in the
processes of narrative thought involved in foresight work and in the
processes through which foresight narratives generate action.
8.2 | Implications for foresight research
In any organization, managerial attention is a limited resource. As
Schoemaker (2019, p. 2) notes, we “are all vulnerable to missing signals
due to limited attention, competing priorities and often, a lack of
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curiosity.” As Klein et al. (2011) have observed, in the face of uncertainty,
good anticipatory thinking may be less about making predictions than
making expert gambles with attention.
Thus, important questions in futures and foresight research include:
“what are the conditions in which foresight work gets insufficient at-
tention?”; “what are the conditions in which perspectives and ideas
generated by foresight processes such as scenario planning or horizon
scanning generate curiosity and broad attention versus selective in-
attention as consequential decisions are made?”; and “what are the
conditions in which leaders and their organizations become stuck in single
stories about the future?”. We suggest that CNT provides a useful fra-
mework for investigating these questions. In particular, CNT would pre-
dict lower attention to information and perspectives which threaten
preferred frames and plans where organizational decision processes show
divided state rather than integrated state characteristics.
This points to the need to investigate the processes and routines
through which organizations and individual decision‐makers manage
excitement, hope, doubt, and anxiety. We suggest a key question to
be “in what conditions do such processes and routines support the
expression of the emotional ambivalence and doubts associated with
uncertainty?”. Many organizational practices, routines, systems, po-
licies, and processes which are embedded and ‘taken for granted’may
serve to support conviction by removing or reducing ambivalence,
rather than supporting the curiosity it evokes.
The approach developed in CNT to examining relative sentiment
shifts in financial market bubbles and crashes (Nyman et al., 2021), can be
translated to foresight research in organizations. Parsing key formal and
informal documents for relevant emotion terms, over periods encom-
passing key decision episodes or capturing discourse in foresight work-
shops, may allow the identification of shifts in approach and avoidance
emotions and episodes of emotion polarization. Similarly, qualitative case‐
based research can usefully incorporate insights into the importance of
conviction narratives, the role of approach and avoidance emotions and
the role played by narrative forms and organizational routines in the
management of doubts and ambivalence as alternative futures and their
implications are considered.
8.3 | Implications for foresight practice
From a CNT perspective, faced with radical uncertainty about the
future or the outcomes of future‐oriented plans, a crucial question to
ask is “where is the ambivalence?”. Our analysis suggests that its
absence may be a strong signal that an organization is becoming
trapped in a single story about the future and is at risk of selective
inattention to signals that might undermine conviction in that story.
If the more important challenge for strategic decision‐makers is not
the availability of new information, but the emotions it provokes and the
consequences for the attention it gets (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011), then
attention to weak signals which contradict prevailing narratives depends
markedly on whether strategic and policy narratives are adopted in a
mindset and organizational configuration which supports open curiosity
and tolerance of ambivalence.
This is not just a question about individual mindsets but also a
question about the organizational structures and routines that may either
support constructive doubt in dominant narratives or contribute to the
elimination of such doubts. A notable example in this regard is the way in
which Nokia was unable to successful envisage a future in which they
exited the mobile phone business until they had made significant changes
to the emotional dynamics of their senior team.
As Dator has noted, foresight work in organizations will have
little impact unless the process of envisioning alternative futures
becomes “institutionalized” within the organization (Dator, 2019a).
Our discussion points to some important elements of in-
stitutionalizing effective foresight processes in organizations. Whe-
ther deliberations about the future and the future outcomes of plans
are conducted in a divided or integrated state can have profound
implications for the ability to adjust conviction in the face of new
information or new perspectives. Vuori and Huy's (2020) study of
emotion work in Nokia highlights the ways in which organization
structures shape emotional dynamics, relationships, and identity
attachment to elements of strategy. Crucially, as we have argued,
the nature of organizational incentives, structures and routines may
either support or hinder approaching the future in an integrated
state.
Our analysis suggests that organizations aiming to benefit from
effective foresight need incentives, structures, routines, and leaders
that support constructive doubt and ambivalence, that support
treating decisions as experiments, and which recognize the need to
support the emotion work involved in tolerating ambivalence and not
knowing, while still being willing to act.
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ENDNOTES
1The words of Stephen Elop, CEO Nokia (Financial Times, 2011).
2Savage (1954), in his founding work on Baysian probability, made the
distinction between “small worlds” where all relevant alternatives, their
consequences and probabilities are known or calculable and “grand
worlds” (more commonly termed large worlds in recent accounts) in
which relevant information about the outcome space, consequences and
probabilities is unknown or must be inferred from sparse data, or in
which the future is unlikely to be predictable, even stochastically, from
the past. We note in passing that Savage felt it would be “ridiculous” to
apply the apparatus of probabilistic reasoning to grand world challenges.
3This is not entirely the same as traditional approaches to emotional
valance (negative vs. positive emotions). For example, while anger is
considered a negative emotion it is often associated with approach
behaviors (Carver & Harmon‐Jones, 2009).
4A reviewer questioned the extent to which ambivalence is different to
Festinger's (1957) concept of cognitive dissonance. While both con-
structs consider the emotional discomfort of dissonant thoughts, in our
account (and the literature we rely on) ambivalence involves both con-
flicting thoughts and emotions.
5We note, for the avoidance of doubt that we do not take narratives to
consist solely of text and discourse, narrative elements may include
calculations, models, images, graphical representations, and so on.
6A senior official for financial regulation at the Bank of England confided
to one of the authors in 2019 that typically Bank officials spent a great
deal of time and effort trying to frame the regulations. But once they
were agreed they moved on to the new problem. Almost all financial
regulations produce unintended consequences, partly due to gaming.
These are largely ignored in seeking an optimum solution.
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